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 This paper will discuss the question of whether the Second World War and the Holocaust 
were inevitable events in European history or were rather possible outcomes of historic 
potentials which arose before these events. These historic potentials included the aftermath of the 
First World War, Treaty of Versailles, the concept of self-determination, antisemitism, economic 
strife, nationalism, and population politics. After the First World War Europe was in turmoil due 
to the impact of the losses (casualties and resources) caused by the war. The Treaty of Versailles 
produced ideas of hypocrisy through both the promise and denial of national rights and pre-
Armistice agreements. Similarly, the potential of self-determination, “guaranteed” to nations, 
were denied to other nations thus creating a sense of animosity. Antisemitism created the 
potential for “willing executioners” of the Holocaust throughout Europe. Economic strife became 
a dangerous potential, since the global crash during the Great Depression, along with other 
economic crises in Europe allowed for the possibility of fascist or other totalitarian based groups 
to rise in Europe since they provided solutions for these crises. Nationalism became a dangerous 
potential since it allowed for states to define who did or did not belong in the state and 
“justifying” the persecution of “others.” Lastly, population politics created the possibility for 
authoritarian leaders to gain power by appealing to large populations of people. Thus, the Second 
World War and the Holocaust were not inevitable events but were rather outcomes of various 
dangerous potentials which arose in Europe after the First World War. 
Introduction 
 The benefit of living in the present is that historical events are often over and done with 
and can be studied with a degree of hindsight. However, a con of studying history from the 
perspective of the present day is that history appears completely linear with events clearly 
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following one another or in other words events inevitably lead to the events that follow them. 
Historical events, such as the Second World War, should not be studied as if they were inevitable 
occurrences. Rather, they should be viewed as if through the eyes of one living during that time. 
In other words, history should be studied as if events were only made possible due to various 
historical potentials. For example, in Europe, the Second World War was made possible through 
various historical potentials which arose before the beginning of the conflict. These include the 
effects that the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles had on Europe, the concept of self-
determination, antisemitism throughout Europe, economic strife, nationalism, and population 
politics. Therefore, this paper will discuss whether the Second World War was an inevitable 
occurrence or a possible outcome of the dangerous potentials which existed in Europe preceding 
the war. Similarly, this paper will also discuss the inevitability of the Holocaust as well, since it 
is impossible to discuss the Second World War in Europe without discussing this event in 
conjunction with the war due to the intertwined nature of these incidents. 
Potential 1: Impact of the First World War on Europe 
 By the end of the First World War in 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919, Europe was devastated in almost every sector. The reason for this lies within the vast 
amounts of casualties, resources spent, and destruction caused by the war. In total, over 37 
million soldiers were either killed, wounded, taken prisoner or went missing as a result of the 
War. Germany alone suffered over seven million of the total casualties of the war, with Austria-
Hungary suffering similar losses during the war (around 7 million total soldiers killed, wounded, 
taken prisoner or missing).1 For Germany, this represented over half of the over 10 million 
                                                 
1 "World War One: Casualty and Death Tables," The Great War. Resources. WWI Casualties and Deaths | PBS, 




German soldiers mobilized during the war.2 According to Robert Whalen, this massive loss of 
life during the war not only had great demographic consequences on Germany but also led to 
subsequent social and cultural consequences as well.3 For example, Whalen states that the social 
consequences of the war included the vast amounts of disabled veterans, orphans, and widows 
which the new financially unstable Weimar government needed to provide care for the 
foreseeable future.4 Whalen also states that the cultural consequences of German losses during 
the war included cultural consequences included the acculturation of the German people to death 
on a massive scale.5 Thus, in the case of Germany alone, the sheer amount of casualties suffered 
both created large amounts of persons (wounded, widows, orphans, etc.) who needed the state to 
care for them, and acclimated the German people to the concept of mass death. This, therefore, 
made the end of the First World War a dangerous potential since the vast amounts of people lost 
during the war greatly impacted Germany demographically, socially and culturally. 
 Not only was the First World War costly in terms of population loss, but also expensive 
in terms of the heavy financial cost of the war. According to Stephen Broadberry and Mark 
Harrison, the First World War cost over 125 billion US dollars in net total for the all the Allied 
Powers (United States, France, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, etc.) combined.6 
Similarly, Broadberry and Harrison state that the War cost the Central Powers (Germany, Austria 
Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire), over 60 billion US dollars in net total, with Germany paying 
                                                 
2 "World War One: Casualty and Death Tables," The Great War. Resources. WWI Casualties and Deaths | PBS, 
accessed February 21, 2019, 
https://www.uwosh.edu/faculty_staff/henson/188/WWI_Casualties%20and%20Deaths%20%20PBS.html. 
3 Robert Weldon Whalen, Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1914-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), 15-19. 
4 Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 49-57, 69-81. 
5 Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 15-19. 
6 Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, "The Economics of World War 1: A Comparative Quantitative Analysis," 




approximately 40 billion dollars alone.7 Thus, the overall net cost of the First World War rose to 
approximately 180 billion US dollars in total.8 This, therefore, represents a huge financial cost 
for the nations which participated in the First World War. Thus, the First World War became a 
dangerous potential since the huge costs of the war impacted the economies of all these nations 
after the end of the war, especially those, such as Germany, that also lost significant amounts of 
people due to the war. 
Potential 2: The Treaty of Versailles and Hypocrisy 
 However, the sever losses, both financial and human were not the only dangerous 
potential to arise out of the end of the First World War. Another dangerous potential included the 
Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles, which was signed in 1919 by the victorious 
(Allies) and loosing (Central) powers, was the outcome of the Paris Peace Conferences (1919) 
and sought to bring about an end to the conflict and establish a lasting “peace” throughout the 
world.9 However, the document was unequivocally one-sided in its nature, with most if not all of 
the provisions laid out in the treaty benefitting the “Big Three.”10 This document represented a 
dangerous potential in Europe for several reasons. One factor which made the treaty of Versailles 
a dangerous potential was the severe treatment of Germany by the “Big Three” (US, France, and 
Britain) through the blunting of German economic, military and political (territorial) power. 
However, the Treaty of Versailles not only treated Germany unfairly but other Allied nations, 
such as Italy, faced unfair treatment through the denial of pre-Armistice promises. 
                                                 
7 Ibid, 28. 
8 Ibid, 28. 
9 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Treaty of Versailles," Encyclopædia Britannica, March 14, 2019, 




 One form of punishment placed on Germany stemmed from Article 231 (commonly 
known as the War Guilt Clause) of the Treaty of Versailles, which placed the blame for the 
destruction of the war solely on Germany and laid out a set of penalties in the form of war 
reparations.11 For example, Article 231 stated, “The Allied and Associated Governments affirm 
and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and 
damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected 
as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”12 
Similarly, the subsequent Article 232 stated that Germany, “…will make compensation for all 
damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property 
during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany 
by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in 
Annex I hereto.”13 In other words, the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay for all of the 
damage dealt during the war. According to William Shirer, the reparations that Germany would 
be forced to pay totaled 132 billion gold marks or approximately 33 billion US dollars, which 
angered many Germans who believed the vast amount was unpayable.14 Therefore, the Treaty of 
Versailles became a dangerous potential since the Treaty blamed Germany for the War and 
imposed harsh economic reprisals against the nation, thus likely angering many Germans who 
felt that the treaty was unfair. 
                                                 
11 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "World War One: Treaties and Reparations," Holocaust 
Encyclopedia, accessed March 22, 2019, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/world-war-i-treaties-
and-reparations. 
12 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," Library of Congress, 137-138, accessed March 21, 2019, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf. 
13 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 138. 
14 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, 15th ed. (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2011), 51. 
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 The Treaty of Versailles not only targeted Germany economically, but also aimed to 
restrict Germany militarily. This arose within Articles 159-210 of the Treaty, which forced 
Germany to disarm their military and placed limitations on the military capabilities of the 
German military for the foreseeable future.15 For example, Article 159 states that, “…the total 
number of effectives in the Army of the States constituting Germany must not exceed one 
hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots.”16 This represented a 
vast weakening of the German military since this is a significant reduction compared the 
approximately 1.9 million troops which constituted the German Army in 1914.17 Similarly, 
according to William Shirer, the Treaty of Versailles also forbade Germany from having tanks, 
an air force and submarines, while also heavily restricting the German navy by restricting the 
size of vessels which the navy could build.18 This greatly angered the German populace since, 
according to Carlos Magana, the severe cutback of German military forces made Germans feel 
that their nation would be vulnerable to attack and it went against the idolization of the military 
which was present in German culture.19 Therefore, the Treaty of Versailles became a dangerous 
potential since the military disarmament, like the economic sanctions, angered the German 
populace who felt that the Treaty weakened Germany to the point where it could no longer 
defend itself. 
 Lastly, the Treaty of Versailles also targeted Germany in terms of its international power, 
i.e. its territory both in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Articles 51-158 of the Treaty dealt 
                                                 
15 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 115-133. 
16 Ibid, 115. 
17 John Graham Royde-Smith and Dennis E. Showalter, "World War I," Encyclopædia Britannica, January 09, 2019, 
accessed March 22, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I/Forces-and-resources-of-the-combatant-
nations-in-1914. 
18 Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 58. 
19 Carlos Magaña, "The Versailles Treaty," University of California Santa Barbara, December 15, 2005, accessed 




with the dissolution of German territories/acquisitions, such as Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, 
within Europe and the entirety of Germany’s international empire.20 In Europe, Germany would 
lose approximately 10 percent of its pre-war territory to France (Alsace-Lorraine), Poland, 
Denmark, Belgium, and Germany lost all of the territory that Germany took from Russia in 1918, 
to the newly independent states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.21 Along with this Germany 
lost a large percentage of its coal and iron industries due to the territorial losses enacted by the 
treaty22 Similarly, Germany lost the entirety of their overseas colonies to the French and the 
British.23 Thus, as with the other punishments placed on Germany (Economic and military), 
Germans were angered by the harsh reprisals placed upon them by the Treaty of Versailles since 
Germany lost a large percentage of their territory while the Victorious powers gained the 
territory which Germany lost. 
 However, Germany was not the only nation treated poorly by the Treaty of Versailles. 
Another nation which the “Big Three” treated unfairly in the Treaty was Italy, which was one of 
the “Victorious Powers.” The unfair treatment came in the form of the failure of the Treaty to 
address pre-Armistice agreements made between the Triple Entente (France, Britain and Russia) 
and Italy. The agreement, known as the Pact/Treaty of London, between these nations mainly 
dealt with the idea that if Italy joined the War on the side of the Entente (even though Italy was 
in an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary) that Italy would be rewarded with territory 
with large Italian populations, such as the  from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.24 However, 
                                                 
20 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 77-115. 
21 National Archives, "The National Archives Learning Curve | The Great War | Why Was It Hard to Make Peace?" 








despite these agreements, Italy only gained a small portion of what was promised in their 
agreement with the Entente Powers thus creating the sense that Italy was “robbed” at the end of 
the First World War.25 Therefore, the Treaty of Versailles became a dangerous potential because 
it failed to honor the promises made by Britain and France to Italy, thus likely angering the 
Italian populace since they felt like they were betrayed by their allies. 
Potential 3: Self-Determination 
 The poor treatment of Germany and other nations, however, was not the only factor of 
the Treaty of Versailles which became a dangerous potential. Another factor, the concept of self-
determination became a potentially dangerous concept in post-World War One Europe. Oxford 
English Dictionary defines self-determination as, “The process by which a country determines its 
own statehood and forms its own government.”26 In other words, self-determination is how a 
state/nation or the people of that state or nation decide their own statehood and form of 
government. This concept of self-determination first originated in the 14 Points Speech made by 
President Woodrow Wilson during 1918, since in his speech Wilson “guaranteed” the 
independence and rights of autonomy of various nations and peoples, such as Belgium and the 
peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, throughout Europe.27 Another definition which 
plays into this concept and was important to the enacting of this idea in post-WW1 Europe was 
homogeneity. According to Oxford English Dictionary, homogeneity is defined as, “The quality 
or state of being all the same or all of the same kind.”28 Therefore, national homogeneity would 
be defined as a state whose population consists of the “same” people (i.e. “race” or “ethnicity”). 
                                                 
25 Clara M. Lovett and Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italy," Encyclopædia Britannica, March 20, 2019, accessed March 22, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/The-cost-of-victory. 
26 "Self-determination | Definition of Self-determination in English by Oxford Dictionaries," Oxford Dictionaries | 
English, accessed March 23, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/self-determination. 
27 Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points Address," address, 1918, in The Human Rights Reader, 308-310. 
28 "Homogeneity | Definition of Homogeneity in English by Oxford Dictionaries," Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
accessed March 27, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/homogeneity. 
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The dangerous potential of the concept of self-determination arose due to the subsequent denial 
of this concept to various nations and peoples around the continent, creating a sense of hypocrisy 
since other states were accorded these rights by post-War agreements, such as the Treaty of 
Versailles. Similarly, this concept, along with the concept of homogeneity, had the potential to 
be used in order to justify violence in order to achieve the unification of an “ethnic” people under 
a single state. 
 Firstly, self-determination became a dangerous potential since the Treaty of Versailles 
and other peace agreements only protected the rights of self-determination for some nations and 
peoples in Europe and denied this right to others. One example where the right of self-
determination was denied to German populations across Europe. This denial came in the form of 
the dissection of German territory, mentioned in the previous section, and the rejection of the 
Anschluss (the unification of Germany and Austria into Greater Germany). In the case of 
Austria, the Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles states, “Germany acknowledges and will 
respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty 
between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this 
independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of 
Nations.”29 In other words, the Treaty of Versailles expressly forbade any form of union between 
Germany and the German state of Austria. Similarly, the Treaty of Versailles guaranteed the 
independence of the new state of Czechoslovakia.30 However, within this state were 
approximately 3 million “ethnic” Germans mostly living in the region known as the 
Sudetenland.31 These both, therefore, represent hypocrisy within the guarantees made by the 14 
                                                 
29 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 87. 
30 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 87-89. 




Points and the various peace treaties made after the end of the First World War, since the treaties 
forbade Germans from making their own unified state and separated “ethnic” German 
populations across multiple nations.  
 As stated in the previous section, Italy was another nation which the Treaty of Versailles 
denied territory after the end of the First World War. Much like Germany, this denial of territory 
also denied Italy and “ethnic” Italian peoples their rights of self-determination. This in turn, 
along with the failed promises of territorial gain, allowed for the concept of irredentism to arise 
within Italy.32 Irredentism, according to Oxford English Dictionary is, “A policy of advocating 
the restoration to a country of any territory formerly belonging to it.”33 Therefore, Italian 
irredentism would be defined as policies which advocated for the restoration/restitution of 
“Italian” territory back to the control of Italy. Irredentists often focused on the territories within 
the former Austro-Hungarian empire, including Tyrol, Istria, Gorizia, and Trieste, which all had 
large or majority Italian populations and were promised to Italy after the end of the First World 
War by the Treaty of London.34 After the end of the First World War, irredentists claimed that 
Italy had won a “mutilated” victory since, as stated in the previous section, the agreements made 
in the Treaty of London were thrown out by the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties.35 
Therefore, Italian self-determination, was denied since Italy was deprived of the right to unite the 
“ethnic” Italian populations around Europe. 
 Another dangerous potential which the concept of self-determination created was the 
possibility for leaders to use this denial of rights to attain power. For, example, the NSDAP 
                                                 
32 Alan Cassels, "Mussolini's Early Diplomacy," Project MUSE, accessed March 27, 2019, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1475304. 
33 "Irredentism | Definition of Irredentism in English by Oxford Dictionaries," Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
accessed March 26, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/irredentism. 





(National Socialist German Workers Party or Nazi) and Adolph Hitler likely gained some 
popular support since they promised the attain the rights of self-determination for German 
peoples. This promise appeared in the first point of the Nazi Party Program which states, “We 
demand the union of all Germans to form a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-
determination enjoyed by nations.”36 Similarly, in Italy, Mussolini partly was able to attain 
power due to Italian feelings of resentment towards the “mutilated” victory and the denial of 
territory around the Adriatic sea.37 In both cases, fascist parties and leaders attracted attention to 
their parties by directly addressing the hypocrisy within the practice of the concept of self-
determination after the First World War and promising to end this hypocrisy if they were able to 
attain power. Therefore, self-determination became a dangerous potential since it made it 
possible for extremist parties, including fascists, to use the hypocritical practice of the concept as 
a platform to gain popularity and power. 
Potential 4: Nationalism 
 Like the concept of self-determination, the concept of nationalism also represented a 
dangerous potential following the First World War. Nationalism is defined as, “Identification 
with one's own nation and support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the 
interests of other nations.”38 As with the concept of self-determination, the concept of hegemony 
played an important role in the formation and practice of nationalism after the First World War. 
Nationalism, according to Nenad Miscevic often raises the question of who belongs within the 
state.39 However, since the concept of nationalism questions who belongs within the state, it 
                                                 
36 "The Nazi Party Program, 1920," The Nazi Germany Sourcebook, ed. Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 64. 
37 Cassels, "Mussolini's Early Diplomacy," https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1475304. 
38 "Nationalism | Definition of Nationalism in English by Oxford Dictionaries," Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
accessed March 31, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nationalism. 




must then also pose the question of who does not belong in the state. Therefore, the idea of 
nationalism in tandem with the concept of homogeneity define who does and who does not 
belong in the state. The dangerous potential of nationalism came out of this since the question of 
who belongs in the state and the inverse question of who does not belong “justified” the 
persecution of “others” (those who did not belong) in order to reach the goal of homogeneity. 
 For example, one such example of nationalism, in conjunction with hegemony, allowing 
for the persecution of minorities occurred in the states of Turkey and Greece in the years 
following the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference. This persecution took the form of 
the “population exchanges” (ethnic cleansings) which took place between these two nations 
directly following the War. According to Taner Akçam, Turkish nationalism and ideas of 
Turkish hegemony “justified” the ethnic cleansings of Greeks and other Christian populations in 
Anatolia (Turkey) through forced removal to Greece or outright murder.40 On the other hand, 
Akçam states that Greece and other Balkan states enacted ethnic cleansings against Muslims 
through either forced migration or murder.41 In both cases, Akçam states that hundreds of 
thousands to millions of people were forced to move between the two nations.42 Thus, both 
Greece and Turkey, motivated by nationally fueled ideas of hegemony, enacted ethnic cleansings 
against minority populations. Therefore, the concept of nationalism in cooperation with the 
concept of hegemony became a dangerous potential after the First World War since these ideas 
allowed states to enact ethnic cleansings against the minority populations living in the nation. 
 Similarly, another example of nationalism, with the concept of hegemony, “justifying” 
the persecution of minorities occurred in Germany after the rise of the Nazi Party in 1933. This 
                                                 
40 Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: 
Metropolitan Books/Holt, 2007), 103-107. 
41 Akçam, A Shameful Act, 108. 
42 Akçam, A Shameful Act, 103-108. 
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persecution came in the form of the NSDAP’s attempts to separate Jews from German society. 
One way which the NSDAP disconnected Jews from the rest of society was the denial of German 
citizenship to Jews. This intent for removal of citizenship is shown point 4 of the program of the 
NSDAP which stated, “None but members of the nation may be citizens of the state. None but 
those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be a member of the nation. No Jew therefore 
may be a member of the nation.”43 Along with this, point 5 of the NSDAP program stated that 
anyone who was not a citizen of Germany living in the nation would be treated as “guests” and 
under laws which legislated “aliens” (foreigners).44 Thus, non-Germans in Germany, regardless 
of their past status in the state as citizens or not, were treated as foreigners in Germany by the 
NSDAP. This, in turn, represents the dangerous potential of nationalism since the NSDAP aimed 
to separate Jews, and other non-German populations within Germany, from German society by 
denying them the right to citizenship and by treating them legally as foreigners within the state. 
Potential 5: Economic Strife 
 Yet another dangerous potential following the conclusion of the First World War 
included economic strife both in Weimar Germany and the rest of Europe. In the case of Weimar 
Germany, the outcomes of the First World War, namely the reparations placed upon the nation 
by the Treaty of Versailles and the hyperinflationary period, destroyed the post-war German 
economy. As stated in the second section, the Treaty of Versailles placed approximately 132 
billion gold marks or approximately 33 billion US dollars on Germany.45 Along with this, the 
Treaty of Versailles placed a payment schedule and punishments on Germany, if they should fail 
to pay the reparations on time.46 According to Roger Myerson, in 1921 Germany would have to 
                                                 
43 "The Nazi Party Program, 1920," 64. 
44 Ibid, 64. 
45 Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 51. 
46 "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 137-158. 
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pay approximately 3 billion gold marks per year, with the price lowered in 1928 to 2 billion per 
year.47 Thus, in an attempt to pay off this debt, the German government began to print more 
currency in order to raise the funds necessary to make the payments within the timeframe placed 
on the nation.48 However, the constant printing of new currency, in turn, set off a 
hyperinflationary spiral which completely devalued German currency and caused financial 
collapse across the nation during the early 1920s.49  
However, the hyperinflationary crisis was not the only economic disaster which plagued 
Weimar Germany. The occupation of the Ruhr region of Germany by the French military 
represented yet another economic crisis which served as a dangerous potential. The Ruhr, itself is 
a highly industrialized region of Germany, located along the Ruhr River, and served as 
Germany’s main coal and steel production centers.50 According to Shirer, by 1922, the Weimar 
government had asked the Allied powers for a delay for their reparation payments since the value 
of the mark had already fallen to 400 marks to the (American) dollar.51 However, the French 
government refused this delay of payment; and in response to German defaults on payments of 
resources decided to occupy the industrial Ruhr region of Germany with French forces in 1923.52 
Along with causing further economic disaster for Germany, the occupation of the Ruhr caused an 
outcry among Germans both in the Ruhr region and throughout the rest of Germany. This social 
                                                 
47 Roger B. Myerson, "Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 160, no. 2 (June 2004): 196, accessed April 8, 
2019, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.uwyo.edu/stable/40752453. 




50 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Ruhr," Encyclopædia Britannica, June 25, 2018, accessed April 08, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ruhr. 
51 Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 61. 
52 Ibid, 61. 
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outcry took the forms of strikes, guerrilla war, and sabotage against the French, who in response 
countered with arrests and death sentences.53 
These economic crises represented a dangerous potential since they affected the lives of 
many ordinary German citizens and their outlooks regarding the Weimar government. One set of 
ordinary Germans, according to Robert Whalen, which were greatly affected by the economic 
crises included veterans, namely veterans of the First World War, and their families. According 
to Whalen, veterans and their families (and the families of those killed or wounded during the 
First World War) were affected by the hyperinflationary crisis through the destruction of the 
pension system.54 Whalen states that the pension system collapsed due to the stresses caused by 
both the immense amount of people relying on the system, as well as the fragile nature of the 
system in the face of the economic crisis of the early 1920s.55 The collapse of the system, in turn, 
caused many war veterans and their families to view the Weimar system as insufficient in caring 
for their needs.56 Another part of the ordinary German population affected by this economic 
crisis was the middle class. According to Larry Jones, “By the end of the 1920's the economic 
position of the independent middle class had deteriorated to such an extent that it was no longer 
possible to distinguish it from the proletariat on the basis of income.”57 In other words, Jones 
states that the economic crises of the 1920’s affected the incomes of the German middle class to 
the point where they were making no more money than the German working class. Jones also 
states that since the German middle class found itself in a state of economic and political crisis, 
ideologies such as National Socialism (Nazism) appealed to them by promising economic 
                                                 
53 Ibid, 61. 
54 Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 141-153. 
55 Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 141. 
56 Whalen, Bitter Wounds, 155-165. 
57 Larry Eugene Jones, "“The Dying Middle”: Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois 
Politics," Central European History 5, no. 01 (1972): 25, accessed April 8, 2019, doi:10.1017/s0008938900000510. 
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stability and protection.58 Therefore, the economic crisis in Germany became a dangerous 
potential since the effects that these crises had on ordinary Germans both disillusioned Germans 
with the Weimar system and made ideologies such as fascism seem more appealing. 
Potential 6: Population Politics/Mass Politics 
 Yet another dangerous potential to arise after the conclusion of the First World War was 
the rise of “population politics.” The danger of this idea came through the implementation of this 
idea through mass politics, which follows the idea that “civilized” peoples deserve a state and 
hold the power to decide who controls the state.59 In the case of Germany, Peter Fritzsche depicts 
this concept in his description of crowds in Berlin both before and after the First World War (e.g. 
1914 and 1918), “…both crowds underscored the popular nature of modern politics. They 
showed the extent to which spontaneous plebiscites on the streets gave authority to twentieth-
century institutions.”60 In other words, Fritzsche states that the nature of “modern politics” was 
based on the support of the masses through public displays of support. In Germany, this made it 
possible for leaders such as Adolf Hitler to garner support and gain political power. According to 
Volker Ullrich, Hitler aimed to garner support for the NSDAP by drawing in crowds to his 
speeches and by increasing the attention that both he and the party drew publicly.61 However, 
according to Alan Bullock, this did not win the NSDAP power immediately since, during the 
elections of 1928, the NSDAP only received approximately 800,000 votes out of over 30 million 
votes and actually received 100,000 fewer votes than the party received in the 1924 elections.62 
On the other hand, Hitler was placed in power after President Paul von Hindenburg rather than 
                                                 
58 Jones, "“The Dying Middle”,” 53-54. 
59 Adam Blackler, "Versailles and “Population Politics”" (lecture, University of Wyoming, Laramie, September 11, 
2018). 
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through election by the populace.63 Therefore, “population politics” in the form of mass politics 
became a dangerous potential in post-war Germany since it allowed Hitler and the NSDAP to 
garner support. However, this potential was not the only factor since popular support alone did 
not put the NSDAP in power. 
 In the case of Italy, like the latter case in Germany, Benito Mussolini was able to garner 
support for the Fascist Party through appealing to the masses. According to, Robert Paxton, 
Mussolini gained more popularity than his opponents, “… by serving economic and social 
interests as well as national sentiment.”64 Similarly, according to Bruce F. Pauley, Mussolini’s 
pro-war messages gained him popularity among veterans of the First World War.65 However, 
unlike Germany, the Fascist Party in Italy focused more on violent action in order to try and take 
control. According to Paxton, in 1922, Mussolini ordered the paramilitary Black shirts to start 
seizing public buildings and infrastructure (transport) across Italy and to begin a march to Rome 
in order to wrest power from the government.66 However, these violent actions did not put 
Mussolini in power by directly seizing power from the government. Rather King Victor 
Emmanuel III of Italy appointed Mussolini as the head of the state in order to avert a possible 
crisis from trying to defend the city from the Blackshirts.67 Therefore, population politics/mass 
politics served as a dangerous potential since it allowed Mussolini to garner support among the 
Italian populace. However, as in the case of Germany and Hitler, Mussolini was not placed in 
power by an election or by the Fascist party taking power by force, but rather through 
appointment by the head of state. 
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Potential 7: Antisemitism  
 The last potential which was in place by the end of the First World War was anti-
Semitism. However, unlike most of the other potentials, anti-Semitism existed in Europe before 
the beginning of the First World War and persisted after the end of the War. An example of the 
presence of antisemitism in Europe before the beginning of the First World War included the 
Dreyfus Affair in France. The Dreyfus Affair occurred between 1894 and 1906 with the unjust 
accusation of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French Army, whom the army charged 
with treason for the belief that he spied on France for Germany.68 Even though the official 
charge for his court martial was treason, in reality Dreyfus was being persecuted due to anti-
Jewish sentiments within the military.69 Similarly, this trial created a large division in French 
society, with a side supporting Dreyfus’ innocence known as the Dreyfusards, and on the other 
side there were those who supported the decision of the French military known as the Anti-
Dreyfusards.70 The basis of much of the Anti-Dreyfusard support for the decisions made by the 
French military drew from the antisemitic nature of the movement, which was portrayed through 
the anti-Jewish media (caricatures, cartoons, articles, etc.) which were written about Dreyfus and 
the event.71 Therefore, the Dreyfus Affair represents that the dangerous potential of antisemitism 
existed before the First World War. 
 After the end of the First World War, there were many instances of antisemitism in 
Europe which in turn created the possibility for willing executioners of the Holocaust throughout 
the continent. One location in Europe which held strong antisemitic attitudes after the First 
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World War included Germany. Even before the ascension of the NSDAP in 1933, there existed a 
strong anti-Semitic attitude among many Germans in the form of the “Stab in the Back 
Legend.”72 This “legend,” which was largely spread by the German military leadership, followed 
the unjust belief that Germany lost the First World War not due to military defeat, but rather due 
to the betrayal of the German military by Jews and communist on the home front.73 This, in turn, 
downplayed the sacrifices and service of German-Jews during the First World War, who served 
in large numbers in proportion to their population.74 According to David Ian Hall, “The stab-in-
the-back legend also reinvigorated the anti-Semitic beliefs and exclusionist political agendas of 
German ultranationalists, conservative south German Catholics, and members of the various pan-
German organizations.”75 Similarly, Hall states that Judaism became conflated with Bolshevism 
and was blamed for all the woes that Germany faced after the end of the First World War.76 This, 
heightened status of anti-Semitism in Germany after the First World War, in turn, allowed the 
NSDAP to progressively radicalize the German population, through both legal legislation and the 
placement of propaganda within institutions, such as schools, after they took power in 1933.77 
These ideas and the progressive radicalization, according to Omer Bartov, created willing 
executioners of the Holocaust during the war, since the war against the Soviet Union forced 
many ordinary Germans to join the war against “Judeo-Bolshevism” and “barbarism” in the 
East.78 Therefore, antisemitism was a dangerous potential in Germany since the “Stab in the 
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Back Legend” and the progressive radicalization of the German populace created the possibility 
for ordinary Germans to become willing executioners of the Holocaust. 
 However, anti-Semitism did not only spawn willing executioners of the Holocaust in 
Germany alone. Another location where voluntary perpetrators of the Holocaust existed included 
Poland. This presence of willing executioners in Poland occurred in the form of the Jedwabne 
massacre in 1941. According to Jan Gross, during the summer of 1941, the Jews of the Polish 
town of Jedwabne were subjected to a violent episode of ethnic cleansing (e.g. a pogrom) at the 
hands of the Polish residents of the town.79 Gross states that the pogrom was ordered by German 
officials present in the town after the German invasion of Poland.80 However, Gross also states 
that even though this massacre of the Jewish population of the town was ordered by the 
Germans, the actual massacre was carried out by the Polish population of the town of their own 
volition (i.e. they were not forced to kill by the Germans).81 Therefore, the mass murder of the 
Jewish population of Jedwabne represented anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland since the Polish 
population of the town carried out the orders of the Germans willingly. 
 Similarly, anti-Semitism created willing participants of the Holocaust in the Slovak 
Republic (Slovakia). After the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic became 
an independent nation in 1939, under the rule of Catholic priest Józef Tiso.82 The population of 
the Slovak Republic, which was a close ally of Nazi Germany both before and during the Second 
World War, followed nationalistic ideas and were extremely religious in their following of 
Catholicism.83 According to James Ward, “By the time the 1938 deportations ended, three key 
                                                 
79 Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2001), 2-6. 
80 Gross, Neighbors, 3-4. 
81 Gross, Neighbors, 87-88. 
82 Adam Blackler, ""Ordinary Men" or "Willing Executioners"" (lecture, University of Wyoming, Laramie, 




factors underlying the Holocaust in Slovakia were in place: a client relationship between the 
Slovak regime and Nazi Germany, a strengthened L̕udák radical wing eager to exploit the 
“Jewish Question,” and a Slovak government intent on excluding Jews from the Slovak economy 
and polity.”84 In other words, Ward states that by the end of 1938, the government of the Slovak 
Republic was prepared to participate in the removal of Jews from Slovakian society. Similarly, 
according to the documentary, Auschwitz: The Nazis and the Final Solution, the government of 
the Slovak Republic used the paramilitary Hlinka Guard in order to terrorize and attack Jews and 
Jewish property, as well as to serve as guards within the concentration camp outside of the city 
of Bratislava.85 Also, according to the documentary, in 1942 the Slovak government offered to 
send 20,000 Jews to Germany in order to fulfill requests for forced labor and agreed to pay 
approximately 500 Reichsmarks for each Jew sent to Germany.86 Therefore, anti-Semitism 
created willing executioners of the Holocaust in the Slovak Republic since the Slovak 
government and people, namely in the form of the Hlinka Guard, persecuted the Jewish 
population of the nation and willingly paid Germany to take the nation’s Jewish populace. 
Counter Points: A Will for War? 
 A possible counterpoint for this argument would be that many people wished for war and 
would attempt to bring Europe into another World War. There were certainly individuals, 
namely Hitler and Mussolini, who wished for war in order to expand their nations and redeem a 
past sense of glory or pride lost during the First World War. In the case of Mussolini, his will for 
war appeared in his wish to restore a sense of Italian military glory and wished to establish an 
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Italian empire in Africa.87 Mussolini’s will for war coalesced in the 1935 invasion and conquest 
of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the 1939 invasion of Albania.88 In the case of Hitler, according to 
Nicholas Stargardt, his will for war appeared in the fact that after an agreement was reached after 
Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938, “… Hitler had raged in frustration that he had been 
‘cheated of his war’.”89  
However, many in both Germany and Italy did not wish for another world war. For 
example, according to Stargardt,  
On 1 September 1939, there were no patriotic marches and no mass rallies like those of 
August 1914. Instead the streets remained eerily quiet. Reservists reported up to their 
call-up points; civilians remained businesslike and subdued. The Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung felt compelled to comment that everyone was preoccupied with ‘what will 
happen in the coming hours and days’. In his Nikolassee suburb, Jochen Klepper read the 
article and wondered, ‘how can a people cope with a war without any enthusiasm 
whatever, so downcast?!’… the fear that the disasters of the First World War were about 
to be repeated was palpable.90 
Stargardt depicts the unwillingness of many Germans towards war through the fact that there was 
no form of enthusiasm for the possibility of war, rather there was a great deal of fear that there 
would be a repeat of the First World War. Similarly, according to Harry Cliadakis, “In the 
summer of 1939 the Fascist government of Italy was not prepared for nor did it wish to go to 
war.”91 Similarly, Cliadakis states, “It is clear that the Italians believed that neither Germany nor 
the democracies had the military capacity to destroy each other, and they saw no value in a war 
of total destruction. They were unprepared for war, and their foreign policy aspirations did not 
call for a war policy.”92 This represents an unwillingness to go to war among the Italian 
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population and government since many did not believe that Italy could win a war, nor should 
they go to war. Therefore, in both Italy and Germany, many did not want another world war 
since there were fears that the war could not be one and the disastrous consequences of the First 
World War would be repeated. Thus, the Second World War was not an inevitability since 
people wished for war, rather many were unwilling to go to war due to fears of repeating the 
First World War and feelings that a Second World War could not be won. 
Closing Points 
 In conclusion, despite the bias which viewing history with a degree of hindsight brings, 
the Second World War and the Holocaust, as with any other event in history, were not inevitable 
events. Rather, these events were made possible through the dangerous potentials which existed 
in Europe after the end of the First World War. One potential included the First World War itself 
and made the Second World War and the Holocaust possible due to the highly destructive and 
costly nature of the war which accustomed populations, such as the population of Germany, to 
ideas of mass death and greatly impacted the economies of the nations which participated in the 
war. Another potential, the peace treaties which came out of the Paris Peace Conference, namely 
the Treaty of Versailles, made the Second World War possible through the outright cruel 
treatment of Germany through the blunting of the nation’s economic, military and international 
power by the victorious powers which angered the German populace. Similarly, the betrayal of 
Italy by the victorious powers through the denial of promises of territory created a sense of a 
“broken victory” and created a sense of anger among many Italians. A third potential, self-
determination, became dangerous since this concept, along with the concept of homogeneity, 
when the victorious powers denied this right to German and Italian populations in Europe, thus 
creating a sense of hypocrisy within these populations. Nationalism was yet another dangerous 
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potential since this concept focused on ideas of homogeneity and “justified” actions, such as 
ethnic cleansing or the removal of rights, by a state so that the state may fulfill the goal of 
homogeneity. The potential of economic strife, especially in Germany in the form of the 
hyperinflationary crises and the occupation of the Ruhr, created a sense of disillusionment with 
the Weimar Government among the German populace and allowed for radical groups, such as 
the Nazis, to garner support among ordinary Germans. Similarly, the potential of population 
politics/mass politics allowed for leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini to obtain power through 
the popular support of the population of their nations. Lastly, the potential of anti-Semitism made 
the Second World War and the Holocaust possible since this concept allowed for the persecution 
of Jews across Europe both before and after the First World War. Similarly, this, in turn, made it 
possible for the emergence of willing executioners of the Holocaust both in Germany, and the 
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